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Response is Local, Relief is Not:
The Pervasive Impact of Agro
Terrorism
Asha M. George*
ABSTRACT

Agro terrorism is a threat facing the public today. National
response systems are not yet able to perform efficiently and
effectively to address this threat. Any locality can be targeted,
and the immediate response will come from local entities,
regardless of how adequately prepared they are to respond.
Knowing that acts of agro terrorism are both expected and
feasible today, we must alter our prevention, deterrence,
preparedness, detection, response, attribution, recovery, and
mitigation programs and base them on a better understanding
of the threat. There are a number of things we can do in
advance of agro terrorism, none of which is impossible or
beyond our current means and abilities. Additionally, we must
keep in mind that although our response to acts of agro
terrorism will be local, these local efforts will take place in and
be affected by the global agricultural context. The global
community will, in fact, be the source of our relief. We must
strive now to plan accordingly, and undertake the necessary
diplomatic, political, and interpersonal activities well in
advance of an act of agro terrorism.

* DrPH. At the time of the presentation of this article, Dr. Asha M. George was
with DFI International. On May 7, 2007, Dr. George joined the professional staff of the
Committee on Homeland Security for the U.S. House of Representatives, where she
addresses public health issues in the homeland security context. Dr. George holds a
Doctorate in Public Health from the University of Hawaii, a Master of Science in Public
Health from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and a Bachelor of Arts
from the Johns Hopkins University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, a wide variety of threats face the public, including, but
not limited to, infectious diseases for which there are no known
treatments, weaponized biological agents, suicide terrorism, agro
terrorism,
natural
disasters,
human-generated
catastrophic
accidents, and runaway inflation.1 Although we can name many of
these potential, current, and recurring threats, the national response
systems in every country across the globe (including the United

1.
See, e.g., Charles Perrow, OrganizationallyInduced Catastrophes(May 29,
2000), available at http://www.isse.ucar.edu/extremes/papers/perrow.PDF (discussing
catastrophes originating from humans); Sarah Elizabeth Croco, Dealing With the
Biological Weapons Threat: Thinking Beyond Unilateral Action, SWORDS AND
PLOUGHSHARES (Spring 2001), available at http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/
2001-Sp/S&P XIII/Croco.htm
(discussing biological
weapon
threats);
Rohan
Gunaratna, Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat, JANE'S, Oct. 20, 2000,
http://www.janes.com/security/international-security/news/usscole/jirOO1020-1_n.shtm
1 (discussing suicide terrorism); Daniel Sarewitz & Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Rising Tide,
NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Jan. 17, 2005, http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/
publication files/resource-1694-2005.01.pdf (discussing natural disasters); Chemical &
Biological Weapons Resource Page, Agro-terrorism, http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/
agchron.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (discussing potential agro-terrorism threats);
James R.
Cook,
The Inevitability
of Runaway
Inflation (Aug. 2004),
http://news.goldseek.com/JamesCook/1092690620.php (discussing runaway inflation);
Press Release, Office of Sci. and Tech. Policy, The White House, Fact Sheet Addressing
the
Threat
of
Emerging
Infectious
Diseases
(June
12,
1996),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-ntsc7.htm
(discussing infectious diseases with no
cure).
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States) are not yet able to perform efficiently and effectively enough
to address them. 2 In the United States, huge amounts of funding
have gone toward creating the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and supporting homeland security and defense programs in
other agencies. 3 However, while non-federal governmental agencies,
as well as nongovernmental and private-sector organizations
collectively receive enormous sums of funding, these entities must
split these allocations.4 Consequently, they have not yet received
nearly enough to fully secure the areas for which they are
responsible. 5 These non-federal entities are acutely aware that
events occur locally, in their jurisdictions, and that immediate
responses must also come from local entities, regardless of how
6
adequately prepared they are to respond.
Any locality can be targeted. For example, terrorists could target
the Jack Daniels distillery in Lynchberg, Tennessee, for any number
of reasons, including destruction of the Jack Daniels brand as well as
the liquor-oriented sector of the U.S. economy. 7 One potential agent
that could be introduced is Acetobacter acetic, which is used to create

2.
See, e.g., Kevin Freking, U.S. Struggles With Bioterror Defenses,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.comfPolitics/
wireStory?id=2940751 (discussing the U.S. government's inability to show an improved
preparation for handling bioterrorism threats, even after spending $5 billion).
See Ivan Eland, The Independent Institute, Security Spending Hikes: Real
3.
Improvements of Bureaucratic Largesse?, (Feb. 5, 2002), http://www.independent.org/
newsroom/article.asp?id=1079 ("The centerpieces of President George W. Bush's 2003
budget are the $48 billion increase in the defense budget (the largest increase in more
than two decades) and the doubling of funding homeland security to $38 billion.").
4.
See, e.g., Anita Dancs, Security Policy Working Group, Proteus Fund,
Terrorism or All-Hazards? Broadening Homeland Security, http://www.proteusfund.
org/spwg/pdfs/Terrorism%2O0r%20Al-Hazards.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) (noting
that the DHS provides funding to state and local governments as well as nongovernmental programs such as the Assistance to Firefighters Program).
5.
See Dan Eggen & Mary Beth Sheridan, Anti-Terror Funding Cut in D.C.
and New York, WASH. POST, June 1, 2006, at Al (noting the decrease in anti-terrorism
funding to "prime terrorist target" city governments, stripping their ability to protect
their citizens).
6.
See generally James Jay Carafano & Richard Weitz, Learning From
Disaster: The Role of Federalism and the Importance of Grassroots Response,
BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandSecurity/upload/95417_l.pdf (advocating the promotion of "communitycentric planning" and acknowledging the important role of local communities in
disaster recovery).
See Mark L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and
7.
Health Security, Food Defense: International Collaboration in a Critical Area of
Biodefense, Remarks to the European Institute: Transatlantic Dimensions of
Biodefense Cooperation and Collaboration Event (Nov. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2006/77206.htm (stating that "there is a genuine
terrorist threat to the global food supply, both at the production and processing stages"
and noting that "the economic consequences could also be staggering").
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vinegar and could throw off the taste of the liquor.8 Additionally,
certain mutations to Bacillus subtilis cause the organism to
become alcohol-resistant, 9 and if introduced and ingested, will cause
food
poisoning. 10
The
intentional
introduction
of
these
microorganisms into vats or bottles of Jack Daniels whiskey would be
considered an act of agro terrorism-an act that would not require
the weaponization of these organisms or advanced laboratory
techniques. The distillery in the locality of Lynchberg could be
targeted, and the cases of illness would occur in localities where the
contaminated liquor, both here in the United States and throughout
the world, was ingested. Comprehensive immediate federal response
would be impossible.
A spectrum of actions can be taken against all terrorist threats
(see Figure 1): prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection,
response (including attribution), recovery, and mitigation." These
activities can occur both simultaneously and consecutively. In the
latter case, we seek to prevent a terrorist act; if we cannot prevent it,
we seek to deter the use of agents and weapons that could be used to
engage in terrorism. If we cannot deter their use, we prepare for the
act; once we have prepared for it, we must detect its occurrence. And
once detected, we must respond to an incident, recover from it,
attribute its occurrence to a particular actor or group, and mitigate

8.
A. Gouby et al., Acetobacter cibinongensis Bacteremia in Human, 10
EMERGING
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
784,
784
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/5/pdfs/784.pdf.
9.
See Natalia Gottig et al., The Bacillus subtilis SinR and RapA
Developmental Regulators Are Responsible for Inhibition of Spore Development by
Alcohol, 187 J. OF BACTERIOLOGY 2662, 2666 (2005).
10.
"Bacillus licheniformis, Bacillus subtilis, and Bacillus pumilus comprise
the subtilis group, which has been associated with a range of clinical conditions, food
spoilage such as ropy bread, and incidents of food-borne gastroenteritis." See M. S.
Salkinoja-Salonen et al., Toxigenic Strains of Bacillus licheniformis Related to Food
Poisoning, 65(10) APPLIED & ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 4637 (1999), available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=91618.
In addition, "[m]ost
food poisoning incidents attributed to Bacillus species are associated with Bacillus
cereus, but the relevance of the subtilis group as food poisoning organisms is being
increasingly recognized." Id.
11.
See COMM. ON SC. AND TECH. FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, MAKING THE
NATION SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
277 (2002) [hereinafter MAKING THE NATION SAFER] (stating that "the suggested
actions include support for all phases of countering terrorist threats-intelligence and
surveillance, prevention, protection, interdiction, response and recovery, and
attribution-as well as ways to improve our ability to perform analysis and invent new
technologies."); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN
2
(2004)
[hereinafter
NATIONAL
RESPONSE
PLAN],
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRPFullText.pdf (referring to the "spectrum of
activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery" for management
of domestic incidents).
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the circumstances in an effort to reduce the impact if another event
12
were to occur-with mitigation feeding back into prevention.
Understanding the threat is an enabler critical for the successful
execution of every other action in this spectrum.
Figure 1. Spectrum of Actions Taken to Counter Terrorism
Understand the
Threat

I ! 11

I
Prevent

Deter

II.

Prepare

Detect HRespondflRecoiyerAMitigate

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT

Al Qaeda (like many other groups) has knowledge of specific
agents that could be used to contaminate the food supply.13 It is also
recruiting personnel that could use that knowledge to grow
microorganisms, develop dissemination mechanisms, and prepare to
contaminate the food supply in other ways. 14 Additionally, there are
a number of food production methods and characteristics that render
food vulnerable: mixing, short shelf-life, unrestricted access to

See MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 11.
13.
See Mark L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and
Health Security, Diplomacy to Advance Food Defense, Remarks to 6th Global Food
Safety and Quality Conference (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/
g/oes/rls/rm/2007/90069.htm; see also Peter Chalk, The U.S. Agricultural System: A
Target for Al-Qaeda?, TERRORISM MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2005, at 4, 6, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/ter 003.005.pdf (stating that "alQaeda theological leaders have specifically exhorted Islamists to use biological
weapons in whatever manner possible against Americans" and that "agro-terrorism
could certainly emerge as a favored secondary form of al-Qaeda").
14.
David Rising, Al Qaeda in Iraq Beckons Nuclear Scientists, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2006/O9/29/al-qaeda-iniraq beckonsnuclearscientists/.
12.
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production facilities, and the use of large batches.15 Lastly, potential
agents include naturally occurring, widely available, genetically
modified, and resistance-induced organisms-as well as toxic and
dangerous chemicals-that could infect, poison, and kill any element
16
of the agricultural system (e.g., animals, food, and ingredients).

III. PREVENTION

Preventing acts of agro terrorism from occurring begins with
intelligence. However, the intelligence process is imperfect. Pieces of
information are collected and added to others, then the information is
analyzed periodically, and the products of these analyses are referred
to as intelligence. 17
Clearly, the validity of these intelligence
products is based entirely on the quality of the bits of information
initially collected. Far less information has been collected regarding
biological and agro threats, and the intelligence produced has been
far less comprehensive for these threats than for other types of
agents.1 8 Additionally, the health and agricultural communities
collect disease and outbreak information, and that information is
poorly combined with intelligence generated by the intelligence
community regarding the intent of U.S. enemies to engage in acts of
biological or agro terrorism. 19 The United States does not possess a
comprehensive domestic medical intelligence program, and the
medical intelligence activities the Department of Defense conducts
are not domestic by law, but rather focused on specific situations
overseas. 20 Furthermore, most intelligence efforts conducted by US

15.

See Ostfield, supra note 7.

16.
17.

Id.
See generally UNITED STATES ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-3: INTELLIGENCE

ANALYSIS 2-1 to 2-18 (1990), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/
fm34_3.pdf (explaining the "Intelligence Cycle" as a continuous process which includes
four distinct phases: directing, collecting, processing, and dissemination).
18.
THREATS

See
AND

JIM MONKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., AGROTERRORISM:
PREPAREDNESS 8 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/

RL32521.pdf (stating that "agriculture and food production generally have received
relatively less attention, or sometimes were overlooked, in counter-terrorism and
homeland security" but also noting that "agriculture now is garnering more attention
in the expanding field of terrorism studies and policies").
19.
See id. at 22 (noting that "agencies track and act upon bioterrorism
information, but USDA needs to be informed also. USDA has limited experience
working in the intelligence community, thus building effective partnerships remains a
challenge.").
20.
See UNITED STATES ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 8-10-8: MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE
IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS 2-3 (1989).
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agencies are not linked with each other, let alone with those of our
21
foreign colleagues.

IV.

DETERRENCE

U.S. deterrence programs were designed to counter the
proliferation of weapons that would be used for warfare-initially
with countries that had created enormous stockpiles of weapons of
catastrophic effect, and then later with smaller countries that were
22
purchasing or otherwise obtaining smaller cachs of weapons.
However, after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union (FSU),
deterrence efforts experienced decreases in funding and now occur
only intermittently. 23 The United States has not yet adequately
modified its deterrence policies to address smaller (especially non24
state) actors.

V. PREPAREDNESS

Preparedness efforts for acts of agro terrorism in the United
States vary according to (1) where diseases are endemic (such as
brucellosis in locations such as Idaho, Texas, and Wyoming, where
the disease occurs naturally), 25 (2) where outbreaks have occurred
previously (such as the previous outbreak of tularemia in Martha's
Vineyard), 26 and (3) where emergencies have arisen (like the recent
Escherichia coli 0517:H7 contamination of spinach in the United
States).2 7 It makes sense that the ongoing presence of a disease

21.
See Andrew W. Green, It's Mine: Why the US Community Does Not Share
Information 1 (July 2005), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/
saas/green.pdf (unpublished research report, Air University School of Advanced Air
and Space Studies) (on file with Air University).
22.
See generally ALEXEI ARABATOV & VLADIMIR DVORKIN, BEYOND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.-RuSSIAN EQUATION (2006).
23.
See id. at 2 ("Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence between
Russia and the United States has been receding into the background in terms of dayto-day foreign policy and official public relations.").
24.
Id.
25.
ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. [USDA],
2005 UNITED STATES ANIMAL HEALTH REPORT
47 (2005), available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal health/content/printable-versionAHR_
2005B_508.pdf.
26.
Katherine A. Feldman et al., Tularemia on Martha's Vineyard:
Seroprevalence and Occupational Risk, 9(3) EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 350
(2003), availableat http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no3/pdfs/02-0462.pdf.
27.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ongoing Multistate Outbreak of
Escherichia coli serotype 0157:H7 Infections Associated with Consumption of Fresh
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would cause a community to attain and maintain some minimum
level of preparedness, and that the occasional outbreak or emergency
would cause communities to become better prepared after weaknesses
in responses are identified and strengthened. The preparedness
described in each of these cases is generally not at the heightened
level necessary for communities to respond adequately to acts of agro
terrorism. 28 However, it is easier to build upon this preparedness
than to have to start with nothing in place.
An act of agro terrorism will immediately change how food is
distributed to affected localities and throughout the country and
world. Because of the way that food production and distribution
systems have evolved, most areas in the United States are not selfsufficient, meaning they could not grow their own food or distribute it
to their own communities. 29 Undoubtedly, some areas could become
self-sufficient-such as those areas where farming already occurs and
where food has already come to distribution points-at least for a
short while. 30 However, many individuals, families, organizations,
and communities have difficulty with following recommendations to
stock months of supplies in the event of a catastrophe, and numerous
food-related systems use just-in-time stocking practices. 31 Although
this is a weakness that cannot be rectified quickly, it is important to
note that there are certainly areas and points in the United States
that could be self-sustaining, especially if they developed and
32
exercised plans to do so.

Spinach-United States, MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REP., Sept. 29, 2006, at 1-2,
availableat http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm55d926.pdf.
See JEFFREY LEVI ET AL., TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HELP, READY OR NOT:
28.
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH FROM DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND BIOTERRORISM 2
(2006), available at http:/Ihealthyamericans.org/reportsbioterror06/BioTerrorReport
2006.pdf, (noting that "five years after September 11, public health emergency
preparedness is still not at an acceptable level").
29.
See, e.g., Jim Minick, Do You Know Where That Egg Came From?, in
FINDING A CLEAR PATH (W. Va. Univ. Press 2005) (noting that "[a] 1983 study found
that the average food item in the United States travels 1,300 miles before it reaches
the dinner table" and that the "existing system already gears itself against buying
locally").
30.
See Katherine McIntire Peters, Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food
Supply, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, June 10, 2003, available at http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfedI0603/061003kpl.htm (explaining that officials estimate that no major U.S. city
has more than a seven-day supply of food).
31.
Mimi Hall, Most Not Preparedfor Attack, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2004, at 1A
(examining how few Americans stockpile food and follow the government's emergency
safety plans in preparation for a terrorist attack).
See, e.g., OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERV., SANTA CRUZ COUNTY,
32.
SELF-SUFFICIENCY,
THROUGH
SURVIVAL
NETWORKING:
NEIGHBORHOOD
http://sccounty0l.co.santa-cruz.ca.us/oes/communityplan.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2007) (detailing guidelines the Santa Cruz community could develop to facilitate selfsustainability and human survival in the face of a disaster).
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The U.S. experience responding to Hurricane Katrina teaches a
few lessons. First, it is important to plan at the state, territorial,
tribal, and local levels as if the federal government will not be able to
provide any resources in the event of a catastrophe, particularly if an
act of terrorism occurs (which would demand that some federal
resources be dedicated immediately to attribution of the act to a
terrorist group), and especially if events occurring at the global level
(including acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and warfare) also
demand U.S. support. 33
Another plan should address state,
territorial, tribal, and local activities that would occur if the federal
government can provide what it pledges in federal plans (such as the
National Response Plan). 34 For example, after Hurricane Katrina, it
was unrealistic for Governor Blanco to request that the federal
government send all it had with the expectation that the federal
35
government would or could actually send the requested relief.
Greater familiarity at the local level with federal plans and allocated
resources, even in the best-case scenario, would have reduced initial
expectations as well as the amount of disappointment that resulted
36
from their lack of fulfillment.
Finally, in a lesson more specific to the agro threat, when
bringing in food from other countries, the State Department needs to
work directly with the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to clear
food, especially that containing beef.
During the response to
Hurricane Katrina, the State Department-upon request from DHSerroneously allowed meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) containing beef to
enter the country without clearance from USDA. Both Departments
believed that the other had arranged clearance; the State Department
assumed that DHS had already arranged for clearance by USDA, but

33.
NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 11.
34.
See generally id. at 1-14 (discussing the National Response Plan, its
purpose, scope and applicability, and incident management activities, as well as the
roles and responsibilities of state, local, and tribal governments, the federal
government, nongovernmental and volunteer organizations, the private sector, and
citizens).
35.
See Press Release, La. Office of the Governor, Overview of Governor
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco's Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina (Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=
newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=1523
(noting that Governor Blanco informed
President Bush that she "would need every resource possible from the federal
government").
36.
See La. Office of the Governor, Governor Blanco Outraged by Federal
Refusal to Accept Foreign Aid Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Apr. 30, 2007),
available at http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=
3&articleID=2832&navlD=27.
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DHS assumed State had already done so. 37 Observations and lessons
learned from such disasters and exercises could be identified,
collected from a number of repositories (such as the Lessons Learned
Information Sharing system funded by DHS),3 8 and incorporated into
preparedness efforts now, in advance of an agro terrorist event.

VI.

DETECTION

Countries throughout the world struggle with the ability to
detect disease quickly. All health-data reporting systems are faulty,
due to varying reporting requirements that are poorly consolidated
even within small geographic units (such as states) and only
somewhat linked to environmental detection systems-where such
systems and technology even exist. 39 As a result, when agricultural
incidents occur (such as the recent spinach contamination in the
United States), illness and sometimes death are the main indicators
of the problem. Obviously, these indicators emerge at a point in time
beyond the stage at which detection of the disease agent could have
precluded the illness.4 0 Historically, both intentionally and naturally
caused agro events have affected large numbers of people. 41 For
example, in 1984, the Rajneeshee religious group intentionally

37.
Deputy Spokesperson for the State Department, Adam Ereli, admitted that
MREs from the United Kingdom were distributed to Katrina victims without
undergoing the required USDA inspection. Ereli indicated that members of the State
Department were "not aware of' the regulatory restrictions at the time. See Transcript
of Briefing, U.S. State Dep't, Oct. 14, 2005, http:/iwww.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/news/2005/10/mil-051014-usia04.htm [hereinafter State Dep't Briefing].
38.
See Lessons Learned Information Sharing [LLIS], www.llis.gov (last visited
Sept. 23, 2007) (defining LLIS as a "national network of Lessons Learned and Best
Practices
for
emergency
response
providers
and
homeland
security
officials ... designed to facilitate efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to acts of
terrorism and other incidents across all disciplines and communities throughout the
U.S.").
39.
Fu-Chiang Tsui et al., Technical Description of RODS: A Real-time Public
Health Surveillance System, 10(5) J. AM. MED. INFORMATIcs ASS'N 399, 399-400 (2003),
available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=2 12776&blobtype
=pdf.
40.
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. [FDA], FDA Warning on Serious
Foodborne E.coli 0157:H7 Outbreak: One Death and Multiple Hospitalizations in
Several States (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://www.fda.govlbbs/topics/
NEWS/2006/NEW01450.html.
41.
See, e.g., Ostfield, supra note 7 (mentioning an incident in 1996 and 1997
where "thousands of people in 21 states within the U.S. and two Canadian provinces
became infected with the parasite Cyclospora after eating Guatemalan raspberries
unintentionally contaminated with the pathogen" and pointing to the 1984 intentional
contamination of salad bars by the Rajneeshee religious group, which "caused 751
cases of salmonellosis and resulted in the hospitalization of 45 of the victims").
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contaminated salad bars with salmonella in order to influence the
outcome of an election, resulting in 751 people becoming ill.42 Costs
of agricultural events have also been high; the Escherichia coli
contamination of spinach in 2006 alone was estimated to cost up to
$74 million, 43 and foodborne illnesses linked to Campylobacter,
Salmonella, Escherichiacoli, and Listeria monocytogenes have had an
estimated cost of $6.9 billion annually in the United States. 4 4 It is
illogical to allow intentionally and naturally occurring events to
sicken or kill people or animals before the event is detected. The
costs are clearly too great, botheconomically and personally.

VII.

ATTRIBUTION

When it comes to any act of terrorism, criminal and terrorist
prosecution is a federal priority. 45 Law enforcement agencies agree
that activities that save lives and preserve the health of the public
are a high priority and that law enforcement efforts (including
investigation and other elements necessary for attribution) should not
46
interfere with, but should instead support, public health efforts.
However, it is also important to determine who has perpetrated an
act of terrorism, so that perpetrators may be apprehended and their
support networks shut down in order to prevent further acts of
terrorism. This makes attribution relevant and intrinsic to public
health, and means that law enforcement efforts should occur while
health care is delivered and other public health activities are ongoing.

42.
Id.; Joseph E. McDade & David Franz, Bioterrorism as a Public Health
Threat, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, July-Sept. 1998, at 493, 493, available at
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/EID/vol4no3/adobe/mcdade.pdf.
43.
Spinach Industry Still Hurt from Recall, MAIL TRIB. (Medford, Or.), Oct. 21,
2006, http://archive.mailtribune.comarchive/20061021[biz/stories/spinach.htm.
44.

USDA, ERS Updates Foodborne Illness Costs, FoODREVIEW,

Sept.-Dec.

2000, at 48-49, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/foodreview/
septdec00/FRsept00h.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
45.
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress
and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html ("Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but
it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated.").
46.
See generally EDWARD P. RICHARDS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
ROLE
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN
PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCIES:
SPECIAL
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
AN
ALL-HAZARDS
APPROACH
(2006),
available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJApdf/role law enforce.pdf (discussing the threats that
communicable diseases, virus-caused pandemics, and additional public health
emergencies pose to public health and safety and outlining key concerns law
enforcement officials must address in order to respond properly).
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As above, federal resources will not all be focused on response, in the
traditional immediate life-saving sense of the word.
When suspected perpetrators are not U.S. citizens or are U.S.
citizens that have fled the country, transnational investigations do
47
occur and sometimes involve multilateral exchanges of information.
However, relevant intelligence specific to particular cases is almost
always retained by a small team of agents, analysts, and
investigators, and the nature of the information as well as the usual
systems to protect that information generally preclude sharing it with
other countries, including U.S. allies. 48 This secrecy may work if
events occur in only one country, but one cannot assume that
eventuality. Additionally, the lack of intelligence sharing will only
slow or prevent efforts at attribution if events are occurring
throughout the world, which would be expected if agro systems are
targeted.
VIII.

RESPONSE

When events are geographically circumscribed, one might expect
the effects and response to the event to be localized. However, food
and other disaster-relief supplies and resources will come in from the
rest of the country and the rest of the world. Furthermore, any eventcausing agents not caught before entering the system will also be sent
throughout the country and the world. Additionally, emergency
response must necessarily be localized. 49
Therefore, since the
agricultural system generally, as well as the food production and
distribution systems specifically, are worldwide, 50 the impact of agro
terrorism is simultaneously local and global.
This means that a variety of different responses will be
necessary to address agro terrorist events, response efforts will be
fractionated, and resources will be split to a greater extent than for
other types of terrorism. As a result, coordination of response efforts
will be even more critical. The United States has yet to see efficient

47.
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.34 (2007) (identifying the role of the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) as an organization facilitating police
cooperation).
48.
See Green, supra note 21, at 35 (noting the overzealous protection of human
intelligence sources by the Central Intelligence Agency).
49.
ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 6-7 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/

nsrd/terrpanelterror3-print.pdf.
50.
See generally ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA, CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
GLOBAL FOOD CONSUMPTION AND TRADE, WRS-o1o1 (2001) (discussing the changes in

the composition of world agricultural trade).
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and effective coordination occur between and among federal,
nonfederal, nongovernmental, and private-sector agencies. It would
be unrealistic to expect a greater level of efficiency and effectiveness
when international organizations respond. 51 However, relief will
come from throughout the world. 52 The already global agricultural
system may well be imperfect, but because it is the only system that
exists, it will deliver relief to the extent that it is able.
There are four alternate food supplies if food and food-production
potential is eliminated in a particular area: MREs, national
stockpiles, other federal holdings, and food from elsewhere
throughout the nation. In the latter case, there will be streams of
food coming into a particular area, and other streams diverted from
other areas. Systems will have to be modified or created to clear food
as it is distributed everywhere, including areas affected by agro
terrorism. In places where agro terrorism has previously occurred,
perhaps more than anywhere else, further acts of terrorism must be
prevented and the population assured that its food is safe and secure.
When food is targeted, there are a variety of issues to address.
All of the following .must be managed: the physical effects of the
ingestion of a terrorist agent, not having enough to eat due to the
53
cessation of food distribution, and other effects of contamination.
Moreover, because of cultural feelings about food, particularly a fear
of starvation, an agro terrorist event that targets food will generate
great fear within society. 54 Emotionally, people will react as severely
to an agro terrorist attack as they would any other act of terrorism.
They will fear that there will not be enough to eat, that available food
will be unsafe to eat, and that exposure will be ongoing. 55 Given the
challenges experienced in addressing mental health concerns after

See, e.g., State Dep't Briefing, supra note 37 (discussing failure to inspect
51.
beef in MREs).
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, numerous countries responded to
52.
requests for assistance from FEMA, including Germany, Russia, Spain, France, and
the United Kingdom. Id.
53.
See Brad Knickerbocker, Risk of Terrorism to Nation's Food Supply,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 2002, at 2 (explaining that a terrorist attack on the
nation's food supply could result in deaths of both humans and domesticated animals, a
crippled agriculture industry that ripples through the whole economy, negative impacts
on plant and animal species, widespread confusion, and a loss of public confidence in
the food system and in political leaders).
See Ostfield, supra note 7 ("The psychological effects on consumer behavior
54.
as a result of fear and anxiety over the possibility of a contaminated food product (loss
in consumer confidence) can also have a ripple effect on other aspects of the economy.").
Id.
55.
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the anthrax events of 200156 and Hurricane Katrina, 5 7 it is doubtful
that U.S. society will do a better job quelling fear after an agro
terrorist event. These additional concerns must be planned for in
advance of such an event.
IX. RECOVERY
Immediate response requirements for any terrorist event will be
shared by both the public and private sectors, but recovery will be the
primary responsibility of the private sector when it comes to restoring
agricultural systems and processes. 58 Recovery and restoration will
also be dependent upon decontamination, which may prove to be
more difficult and take longer than expected.
Elements of the
agricultural system will not be revitalized quickly; soil will not be
made arable quickly, dead animals will not spontaneously regenerate,
and it may not be feasible financially or otherwise to bring in
replacements. Response efforts will be accompanied by a short-term
infusion of funds (similar to that seen with Hurricane Katrina)-, but
recovery will not be characterized by the continued infusion of
governmental funds at such high levels, particularly if events have
occurred in a number of different areas, and if the effects on the
agricultural system are pervasive. 59
X. MITIGATION

Mitigation activities occur after immediate response efforts have
been carried out and recovery efforts are well underway.60 The goal

56.
U.S.
RESPONSE TO

GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY
ANTHRAX
INCIDENTS

OFFICE, BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC HEALTH
OF 2001
19-20
(2003),
available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04152.pdf.
57.
DISASTER RESPONSE EDU. & TRAINING PROJECT, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
TRAUMATIC STRESS, HURRICANE KATRINA: EVACUEE MENTAL HEALTH AND CARE 1-4

(2005), available at http://www.centerforthestudyoftraumaticstress.org/downloads/
CSTSEvacuees.pdf.
58.
See NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 11, at 13 ("Unless the response
role is inherently governmental (e.g., law enforcement, etc.), private-sector
organizations are encouraged to develop and maintain capabilities to respond to and
manage a complete spectrum of incidents and emergencies.").
59.
See, e.g., United for Peace & Justice, After Katrina, Fund Full Recovery of
Gulf Coast-Not War on Iraq (Sept. 2, 2005), http://www.unitedforpeace.org/
article.php?id=3094 ("Budgets for flood control, strengthening the levees, evacuation,
and relief have been inadequate and have actually been reduced. Last year $71 million
was cut from the budget for flood control in New Orleans alone.").
60.
See NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 11, at 55-56 (stating that
"[m]itigation measures may be implemented prior to, during, or after an incident").
But see JANE A. BULLOCK

& GEORGE

HADDOW, INTRODUCTION TO HOMELAND SECURITY
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of mitigation is to take action to reduce consequences should another
such event occur. 6 1 Unfortunately, although resource mobilization is
typically quick in response to an event, interest level and provision of
resources typically decline during recovery, and become much lower
during the mitigation phase. 62 Because of this disparity of interest
and provision levels between the response and mitigation phases,
many efforts and resources are systems-oriented, in hopes of getting
the most out of the reduced amounts of money available. 63 However,
it would be better to split efforts and resources, and focus them on
strengthening systems in addition to building community resilience
and self-sufficiency. Not only must our systems rebound after an
event, but in addition-and more importantly-so must the people in
affected areas.
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

There are a number of things a society can do in advance of agro
terrorism to plan for the possibility (not just the probability) of such
events. We can learn to divert food streams throughout the nation as
well as the world. We can identify and apply lessons learned from
disaster relief efforts and situations involving
large-scale
international humanitarian assistance. We can modify prevention
and deterrence policies to address current threats. We can make an
international agency the keeper of the bigger picture, understanding
both the private and public sectors' contributions to the worldwide
agricultural system. None of these directives is impossible or beyond
our current means and abilities. Knowing today that acts of agro
terrorism are both feasible and expected, we must alter our
response,
detection,
preparedness,
deterrence,
prevention,
attribution, recovery, and mitigation programs, and base them on a

267 (2006) (stating that "mitigation and preparedness generally occur before a disaster
ever occurs, though postdisaster mitigation and preparedness, conducted in recognition
that similar events are likely in the future make these two activities general to the
entire emergency management cycle").
61.

Id.

62.
Generally, the mitigation phase "depend[s] on the incorporation of
appropriate measures in national and regional development planning and "the
availability of information on hazards, emergency risks, and the countermeasures to be
taken," while the recovery phase "continue[s] until all systems return to normal or
Corina Warfield, Global Development Research Center, The Disaster
better."
Management Cycle, http://www.gdrc.org/uem/disasters/1-dmcycle.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2007).
See MAKING THE NATION SAFER, supra note 12, at 288 (noting that "an
63.
overall systems approach is particularly important in the development of a national
strategy for counterterrorism").
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better understanding of the threat. Although our response to acts of
agro terrorism will be local, these local efforts will take place in, and
be affected by, the global agricultural context. The global community
will be the source of our relief. We must strive now to plan
accordingly, and undertake the necessary diplomatic, political, and
interpersonal activities well in advance of an act of agro terrorism.

